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ABSTRACT 
A model  is developed  to  quantify  the  special status of agriculture  in 
the  US  and  the  EC  trade negotiations.  The  role of special  interests are 
measured by  a  policy goals  function  (PGF)  whose  weights  are  estimated for 
each special interest group.  The  analysis  searches  for mutually acceptable, 
mutually advantageous  trade  agreements  between  the  US  and  the  EC  using a 
partial equilibrium world trade model  coupled with game  theory.  Results 
suggest that it is  in the best interest of the  US  (resp.  EC)  'for  the  EC 
(resp.  US)  to  liberalize  whi1e~~~  _()~l:l~r follows  the  sta,tus  quo_  policies of 
...;:--~-~--- _. 
1986.  Mutual  gains  in PGF  values  to both countries pursuing  "large" 
lib~ralizations are unlikely to exist,  although  "small"  liberalizations may 
give rise to  "small"  mutual  gains.  Altering each country's action space, 
and permitting compensatory payments  to  the  most  infulencial  groups  yields 
trade liberalization,  but  free  trade  does  not result. 
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1 POLITICALLY  ACCEPTABLE  TRADE  COMPROMISES  BETWEEN 
THE  EC  AND  THE  US:  A Game  Theory Approacn 
The  difficulty of obtaining an agricultural trade  agreement  during  the 
Uruguay  round suggests  that economic  efficiency is not  the  only criterion 
motivating government behavior,  and  that  the policy actions of one  country 
impinge  on  the political economy  of the  other.  The  paper  focuses  on  these 
issues.  A model  is presented quantifying the  special status of agriculture 
in the  US  and  the  EC  by measuring  the  economic  and political  impacts  of 
agricultural policies on  the  most  affected special interest groups, 
-~---.  --- '--"~"-----'--"-----
prod~~~~s,-Gonsumers,  and  taxpayers.  The  analysis  focuses  on  the  respective 
,---- ...:--_  ... _--- -
negotiating positions  of  the  US  and  the  EC  and searches 'for "mutually 
acceptable,  mutually advantageous  trade  agreements  between  the  two  using a 
partial equilibrium world trade model  coupled with game  theory. 
There  are  three principal findings.  Major  trade  liberalization will 
likely be difficult to attain without  some  form  of decoupled  payments. 
Decoupled payments  allow both the  US  and  the  EC  to  liberalize because 
"-------. 
liberalization leads  to political and net  socia~  .. ~~ins,  regard~es~ o.Lthe 
action of the  other,  but free  trade  does not result.  Without  decoupled 
payments,  there still exist policies which yield political gains  to both 
countries,  but  they  introduce previously unused  instruments  for  some 
commodities  and new  trade barriers. 
Many  authors  summarize  the  motives  behind  agricu!~~~l p~lic~_~hrough 
the welfare of producers,  consUJ!l~r~.~tlg.p-Q..U-'Y costs.  Gardner models  the 
~,-.,---' .. ,,---_  ... --- - .  __ ...... -_.,  -~-.. -- ".",,-.~ .~.~- .. ,,--.  .,.,~ 
objective of agricultural policy as  the  max~m!~~~i:0n of producer welfare  - ..  -"  --.. _  ..  ~"_._,, _. __  ~. _"". __  H_~  .. 
subj ect to budget  and  consumer  welf~E~"M£9nstraints.  Rausser  and Freebairn, 
2 and Riethmueller and Roe  model  the  objective of agricultural policy as  the 
unconstrain.~~!~~~!'o~iQDQJ_~ ,,_~i~~_~_~_d,  .acic:lit~ve  social welfare  function 
over  pr_~d~~er.welfare,  consumer welfare  and  ~~~x~ayers.  This  paper  adopts 
the latter approach  and,  for  the  remainder of the paper,  refers  to  the 
social welfare  function as  a  policy-goals  function  (PGF). 
Following,  for  instance,  Olson  and  Paarlberg an  interpretation of  the 
PGF  is that agricultural producers  band  together in lobbies  to  achieve 
through  the  government what  they could not achieve  in the  market.  However 
the policies which  they promote  impinge  on  the welfare of other groups  who· 
lobby  to counteract the agricultural  lobby.  Hence,  in the  PGF,  a  group's 
welfare weight reflects  the  relative political  influence wielded by  the 
group  in the  determination of policies.  Becker models  this process.  By 
distorting agricultural markets,  these policies distribute  the  gains  from 
production,  consumption,  and  trade  to  favor  groups  with greater political 
weights. 
Others have  modeled  the'strategic interaction of governments  in 
agricultural trade,  for  example  Karp  and McCalla;  Sarris  and  Freebairn; 
Paarlberg and Abbot;  Tyers,  and more  recently Harrison et.  al.  Like  Karp 
and McCalla and Sarris·and  Freebairn~/tb'e solution to  the  game  is a  Nash 
equilibrium.  In contrast to  Paarlberg and Abbot,  and Tyers,  governments' 
beliefs about  their abilities to  influence world prices are consistent with 
and  implied by world market clearing conditions.  Harrison et.  al.  use  a 
general equilibrium,  global  trade model  developed by Whalley  (1985,  1986)  to 
search for a  Nash  Equilibrium and  the possibility of a  treaty that would 
leave both the US  and the  EC  better off.  Their payoffs  are money  metric 
measures  of utility change  from  a  base period as· opposed to  the  PGF  employed 
here.  Their aggregation of agricultural policies precludes  the analysis of 
protection and support of  individual  commodities,  which differ widely across 
3 commodities.  Our  approach approximates  the  actual policy instruments 
manipulated by the  two  countries  and hence  measures  the  instrument's effects 
on  commodity specific interest groups  more  closely.  Still,  the results 
share  the feature  that free  trade  is  ''l:l.();)in  t!l.e  intere.st~.()fboth ,countries  ----------_._,_  .. 
and that dominant strategies exist. 
Our  scope  is limited to  a  single period game  within which  we  search for 
- .. ~~  •• -.--•• --- > 
the  ~~~se~:.~ of a  Nash  equilibr~lIl_~nc:Lthe. ~tc~Jon  ~pace.  of possible treaties. 
This  scope  is not  too  limiting since,  within  the  paradigm of game  theory, 
the successful resolution of treaty negotiations  requires  that,  (1)  there 
must  exist at  l~~~.01:1.e_~ction which  leads  to values  of  the  policy-goals 
functions  which  are  greater  than their values  at the  status  quo;  (2)  if many 
such actions exist,  then negotiations  must  ensure  that just one  is chosen; 
and  (3)  there~must be  no  incentive  to deviate  from  the  terms  of the  treaty. 
(1)  is a  prerequisite to  (2)  and  (3).  For without  (1),  there  is no  need  to 
negotiate,  (2),  and  (3)  becomes  trivial.  Condition  (2)  is a  bargaining 
problem and  (3)  is  a  problem.of  the  extensive  form  game. 
Policy-goals  functions  are estimated for  the  US  and  the  EC  under  the 
hypothesis  that  o~erved polici~~  arLL~!lg~_~._p~~~(:LN.!lsh ~~ili~~.~~_ a 
.'  !l~ncob"p~~~_1;_!Yt!_.A~e;  the  US  and the  EC  choose policies which  maximize  their 
PGF  given the  actions of the  ~her and  the  e~~nomig_~Rvironment. 
Simulations are  conducted to discover whe~  actions exi s.t.  .. _wlLim_a.re 
values of the PGr  that are greater than the values of the  status quo. 
THEORY 
This  section has  two parts.  Part one  presents  a  model  of trade  in N 
agricultural commodities  between  two  "large"  countries  <an  individual 
government's policies affect world prices)  and  the rest of the world,  an 
aggregation of many  "small"  countries where  an  individual  government's 
4 policies  do  not affect world prices.  Part two  contains  a  noncooperative 
game  in agricultural policies between  the  governments  of the  two  "largen 
D  ® 
countries.  I~Ch go_ve~~n~_f~EJls_  prefe;:eE-ce_~  ... ().".erJ.ts  Y_E?_~~:~_~s,  cons~ers 
1.:1) 
and  the net Dudget cost of agricultural policies.  The  governments  are 
------..  ---.~.--
the  ag~i~_':1~_~.~.:_alp~!1cies--'>f_.th_e  other.  Throughout  the  following it should 
be  understood that all vectors are  row  vectors unless  otherwise  defined and 
the  country subscript is suppressed when  the  intent is clear. 
Production,  Consumption,  and  Trade 
Large  country  i  has  M farms.  Each  farm  produces  some  subset of  the N 
traded commodities  in order  to  maximize  profit given its production 
technology and resource  endowments.  It sells its outputs  and purchases  its 
inputs  taking prices as  given.  The  indirect profit function  for  farm  m is 
defined as 
where  Pf- (Pf1, ... ,PfN)  is the vector of the  farm prices of the  N traded 
commodities,  and  Zfm  is a  vector of exogenous  factors  peculiar  to  each  farm, 
e.g.,  prices of inputs  that are unaffected by sector demand,  factor 
endowments  and so on. 
Similarly,  define  the vector of net supply of the  N commodities  for 
farm  m, 
As  Y  is positive or negative,  Y  is sold or purchased.  Summing  over all  nm  nm 
M farms,  the vector of aggregate net supply of the  N agricultural 
commodities  is 
When  (la)  is differentiable,  the effect of a  change  in price on quasi-rents 
5 earned in the  production or employment  of the n-th commodity  is given by  the 
line integrals 
p'  __ In  p' 
I
n 
A  (a1l'  laP
f  )dP
f 
•  or 
nm  Pn  m  n  n 
11' nm 
(a1r  /aPf  )dPf  . 
Pn  m  n  n 
as  commodity  n  is a  net output or net  input respectively.  so  that 
subsectoral quasi-rents are  given by  fln  - ~11l'nm'  Let 
denote  the vector of quasi-rents  over  the  N subsectors where  Zf -
(Zn' .. , ,ZiM)' 
Consumption is characterized by  a  single aggregate  consumer of 
agricultural commodities.  Preferences between agricultural  and non 
agricultural commodities  are  assumed  separable.  so  that one  may  define  the 
indirect utility from  the  consumption of agricultural  goods  as 
(4)  u  (P  . Z  ).  a  c·  c  • 
where  Z  is a  vector of exogenous  variables  and  P  is  an  N by  one  vector of  c  c 
prices paid in the  consumer  market  for  the  N commodities.  The  vector of 
demand  functions  for  the  agricultural commodities  is 
(5) 
If  X(P  ;Z  )  - (Xl(P  ;Z  ) •...•  ~_(P  ;Z  »;  V P  ,  P  ·e R  .  c  c  c  c  -~  c  c  c  c  ++ 
If the n-th good  is not  a  final  good.  e.g  .•  animal  feed.  then  the n-th 
element  in  (5)  is zero. 
Excess  demand  is defined as 
(6)  E(Pf,Pc;Z)  - X(Pc;Zc)  - Y(Pf;Zf),  (Pf •  Pc)  e  R:, 
where  Z - (ZftZc)'  Denoting  the  generic element of E as  En'  commodity  n  is 
exported or imported as  E  is negative or positive. 
n 
To  define  the budget  in the  N agricultural commodities,  let T denote 
.  T 
transpose.  Then •.  aggregate  consumer  exp~nditures are  PcX  •  pToduc~rs 
receive  PfyT, 'and excess  demand  is purchased  (sold)  in  ~orld markets  at 
T  T  T  T  T  prices  P  for  P  E  (-P E).  Hence,  the budget  is:  P  X  - Pfy  -P  E  •  where  w  w  w  c  w 
P  is expressed in domestic  currency.  For  simplicity.  exchange  rates are 
w 
6 subsumed  in the notation.  Using  (3)  and  (5)  and substituting for  Z with  (6) 
yields: 
(7)  B(Pf,P  ,P  ;Z)  - c  w 
(P  _  P  )* XT(P  ·Z  )  _  (P  P)* yT(p  ·Z  ) 
c  w  c'  c  f  - w  f'  f  '  (P
f ., P  ,P  )  E  1R
31f 
C  W  ++ 
Reintroducing  the  subscript  i  to denote  the  three countries,  let the 
rest of the world be  country  3.  Excess  demand  in the  rest of the world is 
E3(Pw;Z3),  where  Z3  is  a  vector of exogenous  excess  demand  parameters  in the 
rest of the world and  E3  is defined for all positive prices.  By  competitive 
assumption,  world markets  clear at equilibrium,  therefore 
where  0  is an N by  one  vector of zeros. 
A One  Period,  Noncooperative  Game  Between  Two  Governments 
Formal  representations  of games  are defined over  a  set of players,  a 
set of actions  available  to  each player,  and  a  vector of functions  (one 
function  for  each player)  which  map  the actions of players  into a  payoff 
for  every player.  This  section specifies a  one  period,  noncooperative  game 
between  two  governments  nested in the  trade model  described above,  describes 
the  strategic interaction that leads  to  a  Nash  equilibrium,  and 
characterizes  the  Nash  equilibria of the  game  for  the differentiable case. 
The  two  governments  of the  two  large countries  compose  the  set of 
players.  The  first step characterizes policy  instruments  as  actions. 
------~'--... ------.-.. '.~  .. --~'-.~- '-'-'-" 
Instruments  are  divided into  two  groups,  price  instruments  and 
demand/supply shift instruments.  Price  instruments,  denoted AP
f  and AP  for  n  cn 
producers  (f)  and  consumers  (c)  of the n-th commodity,  indirectly or 
directly affect the  f~rm and consumer prices of the  N commodities,  e.g.,  .  . 
taxes,  subsidies,  tariffs,  price fixing.  Thus,  for  the n-th commodity, 
(9)  Pf  - Pf  (AP
f  ,P  ),  and  P  - P  (AP  ,P  ),  n  - 1,··· ,N.  n  n  n  wn  cn  cn  cn  wn 
If the  action sets a  domestic price,  then world price is a  trivial argument 
7 in the  function.  If no  action is taken,  then domestic  price equals world 
price.  If a  fixed tariff or  a  fixed subsidy is  in place,  then domestic 
price is a  function of world price and  the price  instrument.  If a  tariff t 
n 
is in place,  then A~n 
t)P  . 
n  wn 
and AP  equal  t  ,  and by definition,  Pf  - P  - (1  + 
~  n  n  ~ 
s  s  ' 
Shift instruments,  Afn  and Acn'  shift supply and  demand  curves  by 
altering other aspects of the  decision problems of producers  and  consumers, 
e.g.,  input subsidies,  acreage  reduction schemes  and so  on.  In the  previous 
section,  they are  implicit elements  of the vectors of exogenous variables 
Zf and  Zc.  To  make  their existence explicit,  make  the  following partitions: 
Zf - (A~,Zf)  and  Zc  - (A~,Zc)  where  A~ and  A~ are  the  analogous  row  vectors. 
Let  the  number  of instruments  used by  the  government  by  Q;  then the  action 
space  A is defined as  a  subset of  ~Q such  that all domestic  prices are 
positive and production and  consumption levels are non-negative. 
World prices are affected by  government actions.  Using equations  (3), 
(5)  and  (9),  and  the partitions defined above,  form  the  composite  functions 
of the world market clearing condition (8), 
(10) 
For  the  game  to be well  defined,  (10)  must  implicitly define world prices  as 
functions  of the  actions of  the  two  governments.  Suppose  this is so,  then 
i  - 1,2 and X denotes  the 
Cartesian product.  Sufficient conditions  for  (11)  to be  well defined are 
straight forward  for  some  act.ion spaces.  For example,  a  sufficient condition 
is that E
3
(Pw,Z3)  is monotonic  in Pw if both governments  set their domestic 
prices. 
The  payoff function is defined as  a  policy goals  function, ~_weighted, 
,----~------.. - ...  .,) 
8 additive social welfare function over sectoral _quasi-rents  (lb),  consumers 
~---,  .•..  ,~.-... -.  _.  - _."- -- -..  -----~  .. ---.-----.-.-.--...  -.~.".- ..  -..  ---.~.  -.  - -- .~  ----~-
of agricultural goods  (!+),  ~I1~_t!:l~_!?_':l~~_~~_-Q).  However,  these  must  be 
~-~.-------
expressed as  functions  of  the policy  instruments.  To  condense  notation,  let 
~--
C_~~~Jhe "other"  country,  let Ai  - (An,Aci)  -(A~i,A~i,A~i,A~i)'  and 
suppress  Zl,Z2,Z3'  Using  (lb),  (9)  and  (11),  form  the  composite  function 
for sectoral quasi-rents_1_ 
~----~-.-
(12) 
Using  (4),  (9)  and  (11),  form  the  composite utility function for  consumers, 
---~-------------.. ------------------
(13)  - p  s  U i(Ai,A i)  - U i(P  .(A i'P  (Ai,A  .»,A .).  a  - a  C1  c  w  -1  C1 
Using  (7),  (9)  and  (11),  form  the  composite  budget  function, 
(14)  Bi(Ai,A_i )  -
(P  (  P  P  - s  s  Bi  fi Afi,P  (A.,A i»'P i(A  .,P  (A.,A  .»,P (A.,A  i),Afi,Aci)'  w  1  - C  C1  w  1  -1  W  1  -
Norm~izing on  the budget  and using  (12),  (13)  and  (14),  the 
policy-goals  function is defined as  ... ---=--------------.. 
(15) 
where  ~fi is an N by one,  strictly positive vector  and  ~ci is a  strictly 
positive scalar.  (~n'  ~ci) ~  th~_~eights  __ --=~~"::!~-P5~nding to each  intE!E.E!~~ 
group,  (i.e.,  commodity  sectors)  and  the  aggregate  consumer  in country i. 
Hence,  to define  the  game  formally,  there  are  two  players,  government  one 
and  two,  an action space,  Al  x  A2,  and  two  payoff functions  Vl (Al ,A2)  and 
To  determine  the  outcome  of the  one  period game,  we  must  specify why 
1 
governments  choose.  Formally,  the  game  is solved through a  Nash  equilibrium 
defined using best response  correspondences. 
- *  h  chooses Ai'  a  best response  to A .,  such  t  at 
-1 
*  (16)  .  Vi(A, ,A  .)  ~ V. (A. ,A  i)'  V A.e  A. 
~  -1  1  1  - 1 
For  any  given A .,  government  i 
-1 
The  set of actions  which satisfy"(16)  defines  the best response 
correspondence of A  .;  A  .  may  have  many  best responses.  A Nash  equili~f-~_ 
-1  -1  -
9 *  *  *  *  is a  p~t~  __ of  __ ~~tions (Al ,A2),  such that Al  is a  best response  to  A2  and vice 
versa.  Intuitively,  the  po~~~!~a..l>.process determines  the best political 
compromise"giY!Il>~~e policies of the  other government.  At  equilibrium,  the 
.. -,~,.¥.'"~' 
other governments'  policies,  upon  which  the best political compromise  is 
based,  are realized.  This  is analogous  to  the  competitive  assumption that 
-'-------->~  .. -' ,  .. 
assumed prices are  realized. 
Consider  the differentiable case  of  the  model.  Differentiating  (15) 
with respect to Af .  and A ..  the  first order necessary conditions  for  a 
1.  Cl 
maximum  are: 
aVi  ani  aUa! 
o 
aAfi  aAfi  aAfi 
(17)  *  + 





An  element by element description of  (l7)  is available  from  the  authors. 
*  For  a  given A_i'  if Vi  is concave  in Ai  then any  Ai  which  solves  (17) 
maximizes Vi'  so it is a  best response  to A_i'  Thus  (17)  implicitly 
*  defines  the best response  correspondence A.(A  .). 
.  1.  -1. 
i.e.,  a  function if and only if Vi  is strictly concave  in Ai  for all values 
*  *  (Al ,A2)  is a  Nash  equilibrium if 
aVl  0  aAl  (18)  aV2 
aA2  *  * 
0 
I  (Al ,A2) 
*  *  Furthermore,  by  the  Implicit Function Theorem,  (Al ,A2)  is a  locally unique 
Nash  equilibrium if the Jacobian of  (18)  is of full  rank. 
In  ~um,  this section presented a  model  of rational  g,overnment  b~havior;' 
the  governments  of the  two  large countries are  assumed  to  choose 
agricultural policies as  though  they maximize  their PGFs  given  the policies 
10 of the other.  No  normative  statement about  the  "rightness"  of the  PGr  or 
the  (Pareto)  efficiency of the policies is intended.  The  preference weights 
(~fi'~ci) are estimated in the next section based on  this behavioral 
assumption. 
ESTIMATION  OF  PREFERENCE  WEIGHTS 
Based on  the  theoretical model  described above,  a  game  between  the  US 
and  the  EC  in agricultural policies  is constructed in this  section.  As  in 
the  theoretical model,  before  the  specification of the  game  it is necessary 
to  define  an economic  environment.  The  MISS  trade model  provides  the 
economic  environment.  The  model  is initialized for  the  base  year  1986.  The 
model  resembles  that of Tyers  and Ande.rson  and  the  SWOPSIM  model  developed 
by  the  USDA  (Roningen).  It is  a  static, partial equilibrium trade model 
which specifies production and  demand  elasticities for  the US,  the  EC,  and 
as  an aggregate,  for  the  rest of  the world for  the  seven commodities:  wheat 
and coarse grains  (grains),  oil seed cakes,  feed grain substitutes  (FGS) , 
(this  includes millings  and other vegetable byproducts,  corn gluten feed, 
monioc  and citrus-pulp),  beef,  pork and poultry,  milk  and milk products 
(dairy),  and  sugar.  Production elasticities satisfy the profit maximizing 
conditions of a  firm with a  multi output production technology,  and demand 
. 
elasticities satisfy the  implications of utility maximization.  . The 
empirical properties of the model  are provided in Mahe,  Travera and 
Trochet,  and hence  are not discussed here. 
There  are six sectors  in the  US  and  the  EC  defined over  the  seven 
commodities  mentioned.  Animal  feeds  is an aggregate  of oil seed cakes  and 
feed grain substitutes.  Of  course,  actual  farms  produce more  than one 
commodity.  But  the  assumption of joint production technologies  inherent  in 
MISS  captures  these  sectoral effects and estimates  the  quasi  rents. 
As  mentioned,  even  though  actions  from  different action spaces  may  lead 
11 to  identical economic  results,  solutions  to respective  games  will differ. 
An  intuitive example,  the first order necessary conditions of the 
differentiable case will hold for  the  actual  instrument but not necessarily 
for  an economically equivalent action.  Therefore  to  characterize  the  game 
between the  two  countries  adequately,  it is necessary  to closely approximate 
the  actual  US  and  EC  policy instruments. 
A brief char.acterization of the  US  commodity  policies are  the 
following.  For  grains,  there  is  the  target price coupled with  the set-aside 
program,  and  the  Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP).  For oil seeds  there  is  a 
Commodity  Credit Corporation  (GCG)  loan rate.  There  is  no  support  program 
for pork and poultry.  For  sugar,  there  are  import  quotas  to  support  a  fixed 
domestic  price.  Support  prices exist for dairy,  with  consumer  price 
slightly below producer price.  Milk prices are  average  prices since  there 
exist price differentials by  geographic  region set by  the  federal 
government.  For beef  there  is  a  tariff linked to  quotas  on beef imports. 
Thus,  there are  seven relevant  US  policy  instruments  (USDA,  1989). 
For  the  EC  a  variable  levy fixes  consumer prices  in grains while  the 
coresponsibility payment  system decreases  farm prices  from  consumer prices 
at the margin.  For oil seed cakes  and  FGS,  consumer price  equals world 
price by  a  previous  GATT  agreement which  fixed  the  tariff at zero  for  most 
of these products.  Producer price of oil seed cakes  is supported through  a 
subsidy.  Milk and  sugar producers  are also protected by  the variable  levy 
system.  Production quotas  also exist on milk production.  Beef  and pork and 
poultry are also supported by  the variable  levy system.  Hence,  there  are 
seven  instruments  for  the  EC  (Mahe  and Tavera). 
Assume  that MISS  approximates  the differentiable case  of  (15).  If the 
number  of instruments  of the  US  and  the  EC  exceeds  the  number' of political 
weights,  then  (~86,  ~86)  can be  found  using numerical  approximations  of  (17) 
us  ec 
12 such that observed policies are  a  Nash  equilibrium.  The  estimation 
procedure proceeds  as  follows.  Bi  is readily observable.  Given 
differentiable indirect profit and utility functions,  duality theory admits 
the  inference of ani/aAfi and  aUai/aAci  from  observable  demand  and  supply 
functions.  MISS  is used to obtain these  estimates. 
81S  86  d  h  Let A  and A  be  the  instruments set by  the  the  US  an  t  e  EC  in  us  ec 
1986,  the calibration year of MISS.  86  e 6  .  The  weights land l  ,Wh1Ch  may  be 
us...  ec 
consistent with  the  Nash  equilibrium hypothesis,  are  estimated using 
approximations  of the  P_~3~_~!  .. _~~~ferentials 8iini/8Afi ,  8iini/aAci ,  8Uai/8Afi , 
8Uai/8Aci'  8Bi/8Afi and  8Bi /8Aci'  n  -1, ... ,  7,  i- us,  ec,  evaluated at 
86  86  instrument levels A  and A  .  The  approximation of  the differentials are  us  ec 
86  86  obtained by  taking small  changes  in Afi  and Aci  from  Afiand Aci,denoted 
aAfiand aAci'  respectively,  and calculating the  reSUlting changes  in iini' 
U  d  B  d  t  d  6ft86  ~U8~,  and  ~B86  (all other policies held constant).  ai'  an  i '  eno  e  ni'  a1  i 
~u86  -86  ~B86  -86 
Then,  the 
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ci
'  for  n  - 1,  2,  ... ,  7,  and j  -
1""  ,Ni'  i- us,  ec,  are  formed. 
Thus  consider  the  discrete approximation of  (17). 
avo 
6ft~6  ~U8~  l86  ~B~  0  1  a1  1  1  ---- fi 
(19)  aAfi -
aAfi aAfi 
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56  -86  toU8~  tJIi  l86  tJIi  i 
ai  fi 
a1 
aAfi  aAfi  aAfi  aAfi  aAfi 
If  exists,  then  -- *  -86 
-86  t.U8  ~ 
-86  ~U8~  ~i  tJI.  till. 
1  a1  l86  1  .  ai. 
aA  . 
aA  aA  ci  aAci  aA ci  C1 
ci·  ci 
Table  1  presents  the  estimates of l;6and  l~6.  However,  before 
/ ..  " 
-------~.  , 
13 
--~.-----.-------~>--interpreting these weights  a  number  of  qualifications  should be  mentioned. 
That  (~::  ,A~~) satisfy approximate  first order conditions  is not sufficient 
to ensure  that 1986  policies are  a  Nash  equilibrium.  First,  they are  only 
necessary conditions,  and second,  they are  approximations.  Third,  voluntary 
farmer participation in the  US  programs  and production quotas  in the  EC 
imply  PGFs  are not differentiab,tle  and possibly not continuous  over  the 
entire range of policy instruments.  Fourth,  the  actions  are  only  a  subset 
of all policy instruments.  Consequently,  simulations  were  run  to  test the 
hypothesis  that 1986  polici~~  __ !trjL..he.st--r:es.pon£.e-s---o.f-e~h other given  the 
----.-.---~  .. -.-.--.-.' ..  - ..  _- ....  --~- --_.-._-------_  .. __ .,---
estimated PGFs  __ ~spayof  f  funct-ions-andthere  f ore-that--.the~_~~e Nash  ----------_  .. _---- _._-----
equilibrium.  This  hypothesis  was  found  to be  quite  robust. 
-----.~,  ~--~ 
Furthermore,  although  the  estimated PGFs  rationalize  the  1986  policies, 
it can be  shown  in principle  that alternative  PGFs  based on alternative 
action spaces  and  estimated from  the  analagous  equation  (17)  may  also 
rationalize  the  1986  policies but predict different  treaty actions.  .-In~~y  --~I) 
actions require  that the otMr's  a~t!.on~es.  (17)  is _~~~~~~t~d holding 
....  .ty:J.(lO'V"'  J 
the other's action constant.  In tne  simulations of the next section,  the 
--,.....--- -,£~- ~-~.-
search for  treaty actions within the proposals  of  the  EC  and  the  US 
implicitly tests  the estimated model.  For if proposals are actions of 
govenments  then they must also be  rational;  there  must  be  actions within  the 
proposals which are  treaty actions. 
The  estimated weights  reveal  the political influence of the various 
-------.-.--------~---
groups  in determining US  and  EC  agricultural policy in 1986.  For  example, 
sugar policy in the  US  requires  that producers  gain only at the  expense  of 
consumers.  Taking  the ratio of sugar producer weight  to  consumer weight, 
the acceptable. trade at the  margin is a  one  dollar gain  in quasi  rent of 
sugar producers  for  a  $1.90  loss· in consumer  surplus.  This  result reflects 
the political influence of sugar producers  relative  to  consumers  in 1986.  A 
14 Table  1:  Policy-Goal  Function Wei~  and Their Ranking  by 
Intere,t Group  for  the u.s.  and  the  E.C .•  Based on 
1986.
a 
United States  European  Community 
Weight  Weight 
Rank  P·us )  Rank  (\:c) 
Sugar  1  1. 56  1  1. 57 
Dairy  2  1. 29  2  1.46 
Animal  Feeds  3  1. 23  4  1. 32 
Grains  4  1.15  3  1. 34 
Budget  5  1.0&'  6  1.00 
Beef  6  0.92  4  1. 32 
Consumers  7  0.87/  8  0.83 
Pork  &:  Poultry  8  0.85  7  0.95 
a/Estimated values  of  .A.  are based  on equation  (19). 
1 
15 strict application of these weights  to  the current negotiations requires  a 
stable political process  and  economic  environment. 
SIHULATIONS  OF  OS  AND  EC  PROPOSALS 
The  simulations explore  the  rationale of  the  US  and  the  EC  negotiating 
positions  in the  GATT.  Simulations  are  conducted in the  spirit of,  but not 
on,  the  US  and  EC  proposals;  they fit into three categories:  ('-~ 
tariffication,  and harmonization.  The  198~  __ US_".£.~~~osal  in favor  of  trade 
~-~-.----- -'--~-~--~-~~---
liberalization and decoupled payments  is examined within a  game  where  US  and 
EC  strategies correspond to  a  range  of trade  liberalizing actions.  The 
analysis  of  the  game  demonstrates  the crucial role of decoupled payments  in 
arriving at policy actions  that appear both politically feasible  and welfare 
improving. 
The  EC  negotiating position is related to  tariffication and  includes 
rebalancing of animal  feed protection.  We  focus  first on animal  feeds  only 
~- ~--'~"-'-~"~---'~~- ~-.-~  ....... _  .•. ~ 
by considering  the  PGF  pay-offs  to various  combinations  of  EC  producer price 
support cuts  and  import tariffs when  the  US  follows  the  status quo.  The 
harmonization simulations  extend  the  approach  to  grains where  the  EC  trades 
cuts  in grain and  feed prices  for  tariffs on  animal  feed  imports  given 
degrees  of US  liberalization.  An  EC  indifference mapping based on its PGF 
is obtained from  this analysis,  and an action space  is  found with  the 
property that neither country is made  worse  off than the status quo. 
Games:  the  OS  Proposal 
The  action space  of the  game  is designed as progressive  steps  toward 
free  trade by  first_~liminating export  subsidies and  then by-liberalizing 
all but the dairy and  sugar sectors.  Article XVI  of the  GATT.  disallows  the 
,- ~- -- --:;------"- ,'_-"  --'--~'- -~--.. -.-.-...... ~  ..  -~---
use  of export subsidies  except  to relieve a  temporary  domestic  surplus of a  , 
primary agricultural commodity. (Dam)  Of  course  this exception has  been 
badly misused by  the  US  and  the  EC.  The  (ber)  simulation is designed to 
---', .. _----....._-_.---. 
16 explore  the  consequences  of an agreement prohibiting subsidies  and 
restitution for exported commodities.  These  prohibitions remove  the budget 
costs of producer price subsidies  for  an exported commodity  which  then 
forces  governments  to  cut producer price supports  and  to  decrease  consumer 
prices when  they  exceed world price.  Sugar  and beef prices  in the  US  and 
oil seed cake  prices  in the  EC  are unchanged because  the  US  and  the  EC  are 
net  importers  of these  commodities.  The  partial free  trade  (pft)  simulation 
is free  trade  for  most  of the  crop  (grains  and oils seeds)  and  the beef 
sector.  Dairy and  sugar policies  remain at the  status quo  since  they are 
viewed as being particularly resistant  to  change.  The  last simulation is 
free  trade  in all commodities. 
More  precisely,  the  possible actions  simulated for  the  US  are: 
sq- The  status  guo  of 1986; 
ber- ~  QD  producer  and export subsidies;  free  trade  in all 
commodities  except beef,  sugar,  and dairy,  self-sufficiency in 
dairy is  followed while  sugar prices  and beef quotas  remain at 
the  status  quo;  . 
pft- Partial free  trade;  free  trade  in grains,  animal  feeds,  beef,  and 
pork and poultry;  dairy and  sugar policies  remain at the  status 
quo; 
ft- ~  trade;  free  trade  in all commodities; 
and  for  the  EC  they are 
sq- ~  status gyQ of 1986; 
ber- Ban  QD  export restitution;  Ad  valorem tariffs are  used  to attain 
self-sufficiency in grains,  beef,  pork and poultry,  dairy,  and 
sugar;  price differentials,  in percent,  between producers  and 
consumers  remain at the status quo;  the  farm  price of oil seed 
cakes  is unchanged; 
pft- Partial ~  trade;  Ad  valorem tariffs of 20  percent are  imposed 
on grain and beef,  the oil seed cake  support is reduced  to  20 
percent more  than world price,  pork and poultry price is set to 
world prices,  ~airy and sugar prices  remain at the  status quo; 
ft- ~  trade;  Free  trade  in all commodities. 
Two  games  are presented in Table  3;  the  US  chooses  the  row,  the  EC 
chooses  the  column.  The  economic  results are  summarized  in Table  2.  Before 
17 discussing the  game  matrix of the  PGF  values,  the  key  economic  outcomes  are 
summarized. 
Economic  Results 
The  economic  results of  the  simulations  can be  only briefly summarized 
here  (Table  2).  For  comparable  experiments,  namely  free  trade,  the  results 
obtained from  the  model  are similar to  those  obtained from  (EEC).  In 
general,  liberalization causes  large  increases  in the  world prices of 
grains,  beef,  sugar,  and dairy,  decreases  in the  prices of oil seed cakes 
and  FGS,  and smaller changes  in the  price of pork and poultry.  Three 
factors  drive  these  results:  crop production shifts  in the  US  from  grains  to 
oil seeds,  feed  input substitution in the  EC  from  oil seed cakes  and  feed 
grain substitutes  to grains,  and  lower  feed  input demand  of beef,  dairy,  and 
pork and poultry producers  in the  EC  due  to  the  contraction of the  animal 
sector. 
Supply and Price  Effects  of ~  Liberalization When  the ~  Follows 
the  Status Quo.  In the partial free  trade simulation  (pfy)i,  the  abolition 
"'--------- ~ 
of the  targetpr:Jt;.!!_system decreases  the  farm price of grains  in the  US  with 
the  result that resources  flow  into  the production of soybeans  and  to  some 
extent into sugar.  Consequently,  the world price of grain increases,  and the 
world prices of animal  feeds  and sugar decrease.  Lower  animal  ;eed prices 
increase  the  production of pork and poultry and dairy  in the  US,  resulting 
in lower world prices  for  these  commodities.  The  removal  of beef protection 
in the  US  increases  the world price of beef;  but the  combination of a  lower 
domestic beef price and  lower  feed prices results  in a  negligible  change  in 
US  beef production  . 
.. /--_."c:---,  . 
The  ber $imulation departs  from  pft by maintaining  US  beef protection 
while  decreasing the  farm  and  consumer  price of milk until  the  US  is self 
sufficient.  The  abolition of  the  target price  system produces  the  same 
18 015 
Table  2:  Econolic  Results  Frol  Gale  Silulations;  Producer,  Consuler  and  9udget  Surplus  and  World  Price  Changes,  Relatlve  to 
the  Status  Quo  of  1986. 
~-------------------.--------------------------------- ------------------.--------------------------------- .. ----------- .. -----...... ----~--
EC  World  World  World  wor;j 
Option  (sQ)  Price  (ber)  Pn:e  (pft )  Price 
, 
It" \  P'lce  ,  .)  , 
us 
I  Wei fare  Est.  in  Change  Welfare  Es t.  in  Change  Weif are  Es t.  in  Change  welfare  Est.  1n  Change  I 
Option  Crop  8illion  ECU  \  Billion  ECU 
~  5illion  ECU  \  Billion  ECU  t  • 
--------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------- ............... _------------------
BS  0  as  8.5  BS  4.7  as  : 1.  ~ 4 
Grains  PS  0  0  PS  -i6.4  5.1  PS  -13.0  6.9  PS  -27.7  '  , 
Cakes  CS  0  0  CS  14.2  -6.~  CS  11. 4  -0.2  CS  24,4  -6.3 
FGS  SG  0  0  SG  6.4  -16.7 
, 
SG  3.0  -14.2  SG  8.5  -25.6 
(sQ)  8eef  85  0  0  8S  :.9  6.5  85  2.0  11.2  as  "  ~  ....  17.4 
Pork-Po. :  PS  0  0  VA  -0.9  1.5  PS-0.9  1.7  PS  -2.3  -3.2 
Dairy  CS  0  0  CS  -0.6  18.3  CS-0.7  -3.4  CS  0.1  29.9 

























.  I 
as  16.3 
PS-16.2 
CS  2.4 
\SG  2.5 
8S  14.9 
PS-14.4 
CS  1.0 
SG  1.S 
as  16.5 
PS-21.0 
CS  7.5 
SG  3.0 
8S  0.3 
PS  0.0 
CS- 0.1 
SG  0.4 
BS  0.2 
PS-O.O 
CS  0.1 
SG  0.1 
BS  0.6 
PS-O.l 
CS  0.3 






















as  16.2 
PS-14.5 
CS  0.8 
SG  2.3 
as  13.8 
PS-l0.8 
CS  -2.2 
SG  -0.8 
85  16.7 
PS-18.S 
CS  4.4 
SG  2.6 
BS  8.6 
PS-16.6 
CS  14.4 
SG  6.6 
BS  8.4 
PS-16.5 
CS  14.4 
SG  6.3 
BS  8.8 
PS-16.7 
CS  14.7 




2.7'  BS  16.3 
1.0  PS  -15.5 
26.6'  CS  : .  ~ 
4.9:  SG  Z. 3 
14.7  ; 
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as  14.9 
PS-ll.7 
CS  -1.5 
SG  1.8 
85  16.7 
PS-18.7 
~  G  3.  . 
as  4.9 
PS-l1.1 
CS  9.5 
SG  3.3 
as  4.8 
PS-12.4 
CS  11. 3 
SG  3.7 
8S  5.1 
PS-!2.9 
:S  11. 7 
~~ 




8.3  as  16.1 
-5.8  PS-13.5 
5.6  CS  -0.3 















as  15.4 
ps- i 1.7 
CS  -1.7 
SG  2.0 
8S  16.6 
PS-16.4 
CS  2.5 
SG  . . 
':.1 
as  11.7 
PS-27.1 
CS  24.3 
SG  8.9 
as  i 1.6 
PS-27.S 
CS  24.7 
SG  8.9 
BS  11.7 
PS  -26.7 
CS  23.8 
SG  8.S 
14.9 
-6.9  : 
-25.8  : 
12.5  : 
-2.4 
35.9  : 
17.4  : 
15.3  : 
-6.S  : 
-25.3  : 
12.1  : 
-2.4  : 
40.3 









Grains:  Wheat  and .course  grains;  Cakes:  Oil  seed  cakes  and  veg.  protien;  FGS  :  Cereal  5uost~tutes (millings  and  other  veg.  by-
products,  corn  gulten  feed,  lonicoc  and  citrus-pulp;  Beef:  Beef  meat,  Pork-Po.  :  Pork  and  poultry;  Dairy:  Milk  4nd  byproducts. 
BS  :  Budget  savings;  ·PS  :  Producer  surplus;  CS  :  Consu.~r surplus;  SG  : Social  gain,  eQu~ls 85  + VA  + SS. 
19 shift of crop production from  grains  into animal  feeds  and  sugar as  did pft, 
but the  lower  US  price for dairy products  depresses  demand  for  animal  feeds. 
Consequently,  under ber  the  decline  in world price of animal  feeds  is 
greater and  the  increase  in the  world grain price is less  than under pft. 
Lower  feed prices  than pft means  higher world production of beef and pork 
and poultry,  thus  reducing  the  world prices of these  commodities  relative  to 
pft. 
The  removal  of dairy supports  and beef protection in the  free  trade 
simulation decreases  the  domestic  demand  for animal  feeds  and  increases  US 
excess  supply with  the  result  that world market prices decline  by  about 4.9 
percent and  3.4 percent for  oil seed cakes  and  FGS,  respectively.  However, 
relative to pft this decline  reduces  the  amount  of resources  transferred 
from  grain production.  Consequently,  the  increase  in world grain prices 
tends  to be  smaller under  free  trade  than under  the  previous  scenarios. 
Lower  animal  feed prices  increase  the  production of pork  and poultry thereby 
lowering  the world price of pork and poultry.  The  change  in US  excess 
demand  for beef is negligible because  of the  countervailing effects of 
declines  in beef and  feed prices. 
Production ang ~  Effects 2f ~  Liberalization ~  ~  ~  follows 
the  Status 2YQ.  In the pft simulation,  EC  grain,  beef,  and oil seed cakes 
prices are  reduced dramatically.  Consequently,  resources  flow  out of grain 
and oil seed cakes.  Lower  EC  prices for grains  lead  EC  beef,  pork and 
poultry,  and dairy producers  to  substitute grains  for  animal  feeds.  This 
substitution effect and  the contractionary effects  to beef,  and pork and 
poultry due  to liberalization decrease  EC  excess  demand  for oil seed cakes 
'and animal  feed substitutes  thereby strongly  depressi~g the  w~~r1ce of 
FGS  (about. 14 percent).  Yor_~~J>..!=,ice  of grains  and beef increase by  6; 9  and 
11.2 percent respectively. 
20 
.  U", ~.  ~(v-oJ> 
\GC,.. ) Under ber,  grain and beef protection is higher  than under pft.  Hence, 
the  increases  in the world beef and  grain prices are  smaller  than under pft. 
However,  EC  milk and sugar prices decline  substantially in  imposing self 
sufficiency in these products  thereby reducing excess  supply  to  zero  and 
increasing world prices of these  commodities  by  18.3  and  5.2  percent 
respectively.  The  prices of the  remaining commodities  change  only 
marginally.  Together,  the policies of ber cut  the  world prices of animal 
feeds  more  than the policies of pft and  increase  the world price of the 
other commodities. 
Finally,  the  free  trade  simulation increases  the  world market prices  of 
grain,  sugar,  beef and dairy more  than ber or  the pft simulation since ft 
results  in the  largest cuts  in  EC  subsidies of  these  commodities  and  the 
resulting decline  in their excess  supplies.  Thus  the  crop  and  input  demand 
effects of these  liberalizations on  animal  feed prices are  greatest under 
ft.  Indeed,  the world price of  FGS  declines  by  25.6  percent as  opposed  to 
the  estimated 16.7  and 14.2 percent declines  in the ber  and pft simulations. 
The  decline  in the price of oil seed cakes  is slightly less  under  free  trade 
than under ber as  the  abolition of the  cake  subsidy in the  EC  offsets  the 
liberalization of other policies. 
>~ 
BUateral} Liberalization:  Bilateral liberalization has  mixed effects  on 
I,  // 
world p~s  across  commodities  (see  the  diagonal of Table  2).  For  grains, 
dairy,  and sugar,  bilateral liberalization tends  to reenforce  the  direction 
----.---~<.-.-----~-..  -.~,,-...-----""--' 
of price changes  under unilateral liberalization.  For  instance,  in the  case 
.~-.--.--... -.-""-.--"- . 
of grains,  world price increases are  greater under bilateral  ~ha~_~nder 
unilateral liberalization.  Fo~ animal  feeds,  beef,  and pork  and poultry,  a 
distinct pattern of price  changes  under bilateral relative  to unilateral 
liberalization doe!~~~~_~~erge because  the direct effects of liberalization 
are  confounded by  the  indirect effects of the liberalization of other' 
21 commodities. 
Welfare ~  BUdget  Implications 2t Liberalization.  As  is well  known, 
the  ECvariab1e  1ev:Y'  system transfers  income  to producers  from  consumers  and 
the budget.  Hence  EC  liberalization gives  rise to  large. consumer  gains 
which  range  from  11.4 billion ECUs  for pft to  24.4 billion ECUs  for  free 
trade.  Budget  savings  is also  large but always  smaller  than the  consumer 
surplus  gains.  Furthermore  most  EC  budget  savings  are  realized under ber 
since most budget outlays  are  from  export restitutions. 
-"-----~"- '-'--'--~-'-~ 
In the  US  case,  m~income_  transfer-s  to producers· occur  through  the 
~,:~_ge~,  except for  dairy and  sugar policies.  Hence  consumer  surplus  gains 
.  ",1 l/1.: 
in the  US  range  from  only  .99 billion ECUs  under pft to  7.51 billion under 
free  trade when  sugar  and dairy are  liberalized.  In contrast,  the  budget 
savings  range  from  14.9 billion ECUsunder pft to 16.54 billion under  free 
trade.  Consequently,  the  greatest marginal budget saving occurs  from  sq  to 
pft when  deficiency payments  on  grains  and oil seed cakes  are  removed. 
Under ber sectoral quasi  rents decline about  16.5 billion ECUs.  From 
ber to ft they decline  an additional  11  billion ECUs,  approximately.  Thus 
incremental  losses  are  large  from  both liberalizations.  For  the  most  part 
they are  spread across all sectors as well.  However,  in the  US  quasi  rents 
of the  grain,  dairy,  and sugar sectors  declin~ greatest under 
liberalization.  The  declines  range  from  14.4 billion ECUs  under pft  (mostly 
losses to grain producers)  to 21.1 billion under  free  trade  (mostly losses 
to grain,  dairy,  and sugar producers). 
\~. 
--r<  The  US  and  the  EC  exhiQt~simi1~_r  l~ve!"~ of political influence  (Table 
1)  but their different instruments  require different  PGF  trade offs with 
liberalization.  In the  EC  a  key  trade off is between consumers  and 
....;: ...  , 
producers  through  the variable  levy system.  Consequently,  EC"budget 
savings,  which  is vitally important  to  decoupling,  is not sufficient to 
22 compensate  completely the  losers  from  liberalization.  In the  US,  the  PGF 
trade off is between  the  bUQg~~and produ~~~_under pft,  but  the  trade off 
consumers  for ,producers becomes  important under ber and ft. 
The  welfare effects of bilateral liberalization are  largely determined 
by  the effects of unilateral liberalization.  Liberalization in the  US 
(resp.  EC)  does  have welfare  consequences  in the  EC  (resp.  US)  but  they  are 
l  ,always ~  compared  to  effe-=,:_~.of  a.I1Y. unilateral.U.~_e;:~~_~ation.  For 
example,  the budget  savings  in the  US  from  ft is at least 16  billion ECUs,  ---.. 
but  the  greatest change  in budget  savings  to  the  US  from  an  EC 
liberalization is only 0.2 billion from  sq  to ber. 
~  Results 2.f ~  Game: 
~  ~  By  inspection,  the  status quo  is  the  unique  Nash  equilibrium 
of game  one  (Table  3);  it is  a  strongly dominant action for  the  US  and  the 
EC.  Note  also  that when  the  US  (EC)  plays  the  status quo,  it always  gains 
from  EC  (US)  liberalizationl .  Hence,  it appears  in ~  __  ~elf interest of 
",-- ---.'.-.--.--._--
each  to  encouraM....the~thu:tQ_  .  ..l_1..};t@J::~1i,,~t!._101hge.lI1aintaining  its own  status  .. _-- -- .  .,---.. ,----_.,,-----
quo.  Moreover,  there  is no  mutual  liberalization for which  the  EC  gains, 
------.-.,~ 
but the  US  gains if it pursues pft or ber and the  EC  pursues pft or ft.  The 
EC  would not be  interested in these options,  since it loses  in each of these 
mutual  liberalizations.  Finally,  it is irrational for  the  US  to propose 
just ft,ft because it experiences  a  loss. 
The  net social gains  (SG)  of the  game  appear  in Table  2.  If the  US  and 
EC  objectives were  to maximize  SG,  then  inspection reveals  that ft,ft is a 
2  Nash  solution when  the  game  is based on  these values.  And,  the  only action 
pair that is not  a  candidate  for  a  treaty action is pft,ber since  the  US  in 
1  .  " 
Gains  (losses)  refer  to  an  increase  (decrease)  in the value of the  PGF  for 
the  respective country unless  otherwise  indicated. 
20ur  treatment of actions  are discrete.  Thus.  it is possible  that  the  Nash 
solution only lies "close"  to  free  trade. 
23 Table  3: 










Policy-Goal  Function Values  For Alternative  U.S.  and 
E.C.  Trade  Liberalization Strategies  and  Oecoup1ed 
Payments. 
Game  Cne:  Using  1986  Action Space 
-5~~:  sq:i~~\  _:~:~t::~~L-~~;::~~f-~t(!;~:'  I  " 
-6h,  299  ~"'l:;~'~44, -l~~S  19/2, -18hs  540., -4948 
-20.75,  10.20.  ',I;';J4i&,,~::i:"!i3'3  -1329,  -::-6'50  -8"&7,-44"09 
I 
Game  Two:  Using  Oecoup1ed  Payments 
sq  ber'  Pjft  ,  !t' 
0.,  \0.  412,  20.57  637,  :,-798  697J  16 
5~ 
.->"-..  ----.-~-.------.--...... ""'-"'<. ......... ,,  \ 
-2416,  ~1  __  ?_2..4kj  2853,  : 354  2968  640.  \ 
1466,  29  190.5,  1931  20.71 ,  ~,168  260.6  424 
1559,  1o.2~  20.99,  2255  240.0.,  11 ,334  260.0.  868 
a/See  text for definition of actions. 
b/X,y  is x  _  V86  and  y  _  V86 
us  ec 
24 terms of SG,  is made  worse  off relative  to  the  status  quo.  Consumer  groups 
and  those  concerned with US  and  EC  budget  transfers would  tend  to  advocate 
free  trade actions.  However,  there are  numerous  instances where  US 
consumers  are made  worse  off while  there are no  cases  where  EC  consumers  are 
made  worse  off.  These  results also suggest that various  interest groups 
prefer different treaty actions.  The  problem  faced by  the political process 
is  the  relative  importance  to attach to  these  diverse  groups;  the  PGF 
summarizes  the  resolution of the  competition among  these  groups  for 
political influence. 
~~:  The  1986  proposal of the  US  at the Uruguay Negotiating Round 
called for  free  trade  in agricultural products with  the  provision that 
governments  could make  decoupled payments  as  income  transfers  to  farmers 
(National Center).  Since  1986,  the  US  has  base_<!_PClY!!l~E_;~_ ;~  __ fo!l,rmers  on 
traditional yields  and acreage  whether  they plant or not as part of the  ------------
set-aside program  (USDA,  1989).  Similarly the  EC  has  instituted 
production quotas,  land set-"a-side  and less  favored areas  programs  which 
weaken  the  link between  income  transfers  and production incentives. 
In the spirit of these policies,  Game  Two  alters  the  action space  of 
Game  One.  Explicit transfers of the  b~~g~J;  ___ sJ~.Yl!l~ccruing from  the 
~i~olicies  simulated in Game  One  are made  to  commodity  sectors 
}as comp,-!nsa.;to~~~~~_th~~me_~~_~~_e,~_  t~  __ producers  ~ssociatec! with 
liberalization.  The  compensation rule is as  follows.  Complete  compensation 
is offered to sectors with  the highest policy-goal weights  first and 
proceeding to sectors of lower weights  ~til the  budget savings  are 
exhausted.  Sectors with weights  lower  than one  are excluded  from 
i 
compensation.  The  distributional rule maximizes  the  PGF  given that the 
/' 
tQfal  transfer is no  larger than the  budget savings  from  trade 
liberalization and that no  one  is over  compensated.  As  such it is  a  partial 
25 3  Pareto compensation rule. 
For every US  liberalization and any  EC  policy,  the  US  budget  savings  is 
s~_to  compensate  sectors with weights  greater than one  fully. 
However,  for noEC liberalization in Game  One  is  the budget  savings 
sufficient to compensate  the  losers completely regardless  of the  US 
action,  because,  in contrast to  the US,  income  support  in the  EC  is largely 
from  consumers.  EC  budgetary savings  occur only  on  exports  and cannot  fully 
compensate  farms  for  the  lost  income  which was  transferred from  consumers 
through high domestic  prices. 
The  '  appended  in the payoff matrix of game  two  (Table  3)  to  an action 
reflects  the addition of the  transfer  to  each of game  one's actions. 
Through decoupling,  only actions sq,pft'  and pft' ,pft'  are not treaty 
actions  since  the  EC  suffers a  political loss relative to  the  status quo. 
Although  the  addition of the  transfer has  no  effect on production and 
consumptions  decisions,  hence  prices,  the  introduction of transfer payments 
produces  a  new  Nash  equilibrium,  both  pla~ ber'.  In fact,  ber'  strongly 
~.-. 
dominates  every other strategy of the  US  and  the  EC.  It is in the best 
'--------~  .... -.  l£o-Js  /4> 
:.,,.,,J (~trvliJ 
LLf'-<.vvc:(I. r 
othe..r  .. ·  ... Because  the  expedient political choice  is still to .let the  consumer 
••  ;  •••  0,"" 
make  an  income  transfer to  farms  through a  higher  domestic  price,  freer 
trade results.  Free  trade  does  not. 
Partial Tariffication:  Animal  Feeds  in the l.C. 
The  October  1989  proposal  of the  US  called for tariffication,  i.e.,  the 
3The  compensation rule of game  two  assumes  that one  dollar in a  decoupled 
transfer has  the  ~ame marginal  impact  on the  PGF  as  a  dollar ,transferred 
through commodity policy.  If decoupled'transfers  require  more  lobbying 
effort to sustain than do  commodity  transfers,  then  the. assumption is 
violated and larger budget  transfers would  likely be  required to retain the 
status quo.  The  marginal  impacts  are  also likely to  be  different for  the  US 
than the  EC  because  of differences  in the  source of transfer  (budget relative 
to consumers)  and political structures. 
26 transformation of all trade barriers  into their tariff equivalents  (USDA 
publication)  However,  no  tariffs exist on animal  feed  in the  EC  but 
producers of oil seed cakes  receive  subsidies  on domestically produced oil 
seeds.  In this case,  tariffication concerns  any mutual  advantage  that might 
exist in trading a  tariff on animal  feeds  in the  EC  for cuts  in subsidies  to 
producers of oil seed cakes.  This  trade-off is investigated in this 
section.  The  results suggest that  the  EC  and  the  US  can gain from  the 
imposition of tariffs on  animal  feeds  for  a  reduction of subsidies  to oil 
seed cakes  producers. 
Nine  simulations  were  performed.  Holding all other  EC  policies at  the 
status  quo  of 1986,  tariffs are  imposed  on oil seed cakes  and  feed grain 
substitutes  in increments  of ten percent,  from  zero  to eighty percent.  No 
change  is made  in US  policies  Tariffication on oil seed cakes  requires 
equality of  farm  and  consumer  prices;  hence  these prices differ from  world 
price by  the  amount  of the  tariff.  For  FGS,  farm  and  consumer prices are 
already equal;  tariffication merely  introduces  a  wedge  between domestic  and 
world prices.  The  effects of tariffication are  shown  in the  Figures  1,  2, 
and3. 
Tariffication causes  changes  in the  EC  budget,  consumer  surplus  and 
incomes  of animal  feeds,  beef,  dairy,  and pork  and poultry producers.  These 
measures  crucially determine  the value of the  PGF,  V
8S
.  To  ease  the  graphic 
ec 
analysis  (Figure 1),  the applied welfare  measures  of the direct and  indirect 
users of animal  feeds  are  aggregated using  the welfare weights  of Table  1. 
For every level of tariffication,  the users  of animals  feeds  in the  EC 
suffer  income  losses  and  the  EC's  net budget position improves.  The 
producers  of animal  feeds  experience  income  losses  except  for  the largest 
tariffs. 
The  users of animal  feeds  lose at zero tariffs because  the world price 
27 FIGURE  ONE 
Tariffication Effects on  E.C.  Welfare 
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28 increases  for oil seed cakes.  Since  producer subsidies  are  zero  domestic 
cake  production contracts.  As  a  consequence,  EC  excess  demand  increases 
pushing  the world price of animal  feeds  up.  The  EC  net budget position 
improves both directly and  indirectly from  tariffication.  It improves 
directly as  tariffs on animal  feeds  earn revenues  and oils seed cakes 
producers  are protected and not  subsidized.  It improves  indirectly because 
tariffs increase  animal  feed costs  of beef,  dairy,  and pork and poultry. 
Hence,  the  quantity of animal  products  supplied is  reduced cutting excess 
supply in the  EC  thereby  reducing restitution payments.  The  subsidies 
received by  EC  producers  of oil seed cakes  in the  base  year are  larger than 
the protection afforded by  the  range  of tariffs simulated.  Their quasi  rent 
loss  is greatest at zero tariffs and decreases  as  greater tariffs increase 
domestic price. 
Changes  in world markets  resulting from  EC  tariffication alter the  US 
budget,  consumer  surplus,  and  the  producer surpluses  of animal  feeds,  beef, 
dairy,  and pork and poultry;  they  determine  the  PGF  of the  US.  However,  a 
different scenario  transpires  in the  US  because  it uses  different 
instruments.  US  feed producer and user prices  follow world prices.  At  zero 
tariffs,  the  gain to  US  feed producers  is largest because  the world prices 
of animal  feeds  is greatest.  Increasing tariffs depress  world prices.  When 
world prices fall  the  change  in producer surplus  turns  from  a  gain to  a 
loss.  For users  the reverse is true.  At  low  tariff levels,  when  world 
price of animal  feeds  lies above  the world price at the  status  quo,  the 
users experience  a  welfare  loss.  As  world price falls below  the  status quo 
world price users  gain.  Budget  savings  occur because  lower oil seed cake 
prices  decreas~ oil seed cake  production in the  US  which  in turn decreases 
budget outlays.  Figure  (2)  depicts  these  results. 
Figure  (3)  shows  the V
86  and V
86  of tariffication which  result from  the 
~  ec 
29 weighted summation of user value,  producer value,  the  budget,  and  the 
smaller gains  and losses of producers of other commodities  in the  US  and  EC 
respectively.  When  the  EC  must  tie the producer price of oil seed cakes  to 
the  consumer price of oil seed cakes  the protection of producers  occurs  only 
at the  expense of users.  The  result is that V
86  is maximized not at  the 
ec 
status quo  level of producer prices but at the  lower  level of forty percent. 
86  For  the  US  when  tariffs are between  zero and fifteen percent,  V  is 
ua 
positive because  the  gains  to producers  and  the  budget  outweigh  the  loss  to 
users.  For tariff rates  from  fifteen to forty percent,  the  gains  to users 
and budget  outweigh  the  loss  to  producers  hence  V
86  is still positive. 
ua 
After forty percent  the  losses  to  producers  dominate  the  gains of users  and 
the budget.  Consequently V
86  is negative. 
us 
86  At  tariff levels between  zero  and forty percent V  is positive.  At 
ua 
86  tariff levels between seven  and  seventy  three percent V  is positive. 
ec 
These  results  imply  that tariffication ~n animal  feeds  is  likely to be 
politically acceptable if i~ occurs within the  seven  to  forty percent range, 
all else constant.  By  comparison with  game  two,  the  gains  from 
tariffication are small  compared  to  those which  result from  decoupling. 
EC  Harmonization  - US  liberalization Trade-Offs 
An  important  component  of the  EC's  position at the  current  GATT  round 
is  the harmonization or rebalancing of the prices of imported animal  feeds 
with  the domestic prices of grain  (EEC).  In essence,  since  a  significant 
portion of EC  grain production supplies  feed to animals,  the  EC  wishes  to 
trade cuts  in the  support price of grains  and cakes  for  tariffs on  cakes  and 
FGS  (National  C~nter).  These  tariffs are currently prohibited by previous 
GATT  agreements. 
Insights  into these  trade offs are obtained by  performing simulations 
for  a  set of tariffs on  animal  feeds  in the  EC,  cuts  in the  EC  price 
30 FIGURE  TWO 
Tariffication Effects on  U.S.  Welfare 
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31 FIGURE  THREE 
Policy-Goals Function  Values 
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32 supports of grains  and oil seed cakes,  and liberalizing policies  in grains 
and animal  feeds  in the US.  A treaty action space  is found  to exist where 
the harmonization  - liberalization trade offs yield non-negative values  of 
the  EC  and US  PGFs.  All other policies  remain unchanged  from  the  status quo 
of 1986.  Yet  the  improvements  in the  PGFs  of the  US  and  the  EC  for actions 
in this  space  are  modest  compared  to  gains  from  decoupled  payments. 
The  estimation proceeds  in  two  steps.  First,  simulations  are performed 
to find combinations  of  EC  harmonizations  for  given US  actions  that  leave 
the  EC  no  worse off than the  status  quo.  For  a  given US  action,  a 
coordinate point is obtained for  each  EC  harmonization.  To  illustrate, 
consider curve  4,  coordinate  A,  Figure  4.  The  US  pursues  free  trade  in 
grains  and oil seed cakes  which  leaves  V
86  positive.  To  reduce  V
86  to  zero  ec  ec 
(its status quo  value),  the  EC  wedges  between  the  consumer  - producer prices 
of grains  and  the world grain price,  and  the  EC  wedge  between the  producer 
and world price of oil seed cakes  are  reduced until V
86  is zero.  The  needed  ec 
decrease  in the price wedge  1s  13.1  percent.  At  coordinate  B,  these price 
wedges  are cut by  15  percent;  since  this  leaves  the  V
86  negative,  it is  ec 
necessary to  levy a  tariff of 5.8 percent on oil seed cakes  and  FGS  to 
86  restore V  to zero.  At  coordinate  D,  a  tariff rate of 40  percent on  these  ec 
86  commodities  requires  a  price wedge  cut of 9.5 percent  to attain a  V  of  ec 
zero.  Connecting A,  B,  C,  and  D defines  the  EC's  indifference  curve  for  the 
given US  action.  Their coordinate values  also appear  in the bottom panel of 
Table 4. 
Note  that if the  US  "buys"  wedge  cuts with tariffs,  the  cheaper 
"purchases"  occur at tariff rates  no  greater  than the  point of inflection, 
C.  Finally.  for  each of these coordinate points.  the. value  of the US's  PGF 
is recorded.  These values  are negative  for  the mentioned points.  The  other 
US  policy actions are:  curve  1  (first panel.  Table  4),  the  status quo  of 
33 Figure 4:  E.C.  Harmonization 
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34 
o 1986;  curve  2  (second panel),  abolish the  export  enhancement  program,  no 
Commodity  Credit Corporation support of animal  feeds,  and set the price of 
grain at 1.25 of the world price;  curve  3  (third panel),  same  as  curve  2 
except reduce  the price of grain to  1.16 of the  world price;  curve  4  (fourth 
panel),  free  trade.  US  animal  product and  sugar policies are  unchanged  from 
the status  quo. 
The  indifference curves  and their respective  US  policies  identify the 
top  and bottom boundaries  of a  treaty action space  in EC  harmonization and 
US  liberalization of the  grain and animal  feeds  sectors.  The  second step 
finds  the left and right hand boundaries  of the  treaty action space.  The 
86  86  left hand boundary  traces  those  EC  harmonizations  which set V  and V  equal  ec  us 
to zero for  a  given US  liberalization.  On  the  right hand boundary,  the  US 
pursues  the  status  quo  (it smallest liberalization).  The  coordinate points 
on  the right hand boundary depict  EC  harmonizations where  V
86  is zero  and  us 
V
86  .  •  i  4  loS  POS1.t  ve  ec  Further movement  to che right  leads  to negative values  of 
V
86  Hence,  this boundary  identifies  those points of smallest harmonization  us' 
in the  EC  and smallest liberalization in the  US. 
Within these  four boundaries  is  the  treaty action space  of 
harmonization and  liberalization such  that for  any  harmonization 
(liberalization)  in the  space,  there is at least one  liberalization 
(harmonization)  in the  space  such that the  PGFs  of the  US  and  the  EC  are at 
least zero.  As  shown  in Figure 4,  the  treaty action space  suggests  that 
considerable latitude exists for  trading  EC  tariffs and price cuts  in grain 
and oil seed prices  for US  liberalization in grains  and  animal  feeds. 
4In other words:  beginning with curve  1  where  the  US  is  following  the  status 
quo,  movement  towar'd  the  right hand boundary  traces  a  locus  of  EC 
harmonizations.  Since  the  US  action is fixed,  movement  toward  the boundary 
results in an increase  in the  EC's  PGF  and  a  decrease  in the US's  PGF.  At 
the boundary,  the US's  PGF  is zero,  beyond  the boundary,  it is negative. 
35 Table  4:  In Search of Harmonization:  E.C.  Tariffs on Animal  Feeds 
and  Cuts  in Grain and Oil  Seed Cakes  Suppo·rt  for  U. S . 
Cuts  in Grain and Animal  Feed  Support. 
E.C. 
Grain and Oil 
Seed Cakes: 
Change  in Dom-
estic to World 
Price Wedge  <%) 
E.C 
Ad  Valorem Tariff 
on  Animal  Feeds  <%) 
U.S  Value  of 
Policy Goals  I 
Function  (V::)a 
o 
-5 
Panel  1:  US  Action:  Status Quo 
























No  CCC  support,  P  - 1. 25*P  fg  wg 
0  48 
5  87 
32  88 
45  38 
No  CCC  support,  P  - 1.16  P  fg  wg 
0  -36 
5.8  -1 
32  0 
45  -47 
No  CCC  support,  P  - P  fg  wg 
0  -377 
5.8  -350 
33.5  -350 
45  -388 
alEC  policy-goal  function values  equal  zero  for all simulations. 
36 However,  as  noted in more  detail below,  the political and social gains  are 
small relative to  those obtained from  decoup1ing. 
Finally,  Table  4  reveals  two  important results which  are not easily 
seen from  Figure 4: 
(1)  As  the  US  liberalizes,  the  intercepts of the  indifference curves 
on the  wedge  cut axis  increase  (in absolute  terms),  but  the  difference 
between the  largest and  smallest wedge  cut on  an  indifference curve 
decreases.  Hence,  the  greatest cut  in the  EC  support price of grain and 
cakes  which  the  US  could obtain through harmonization and,  which  the  EC  is 
willing to  trade,  decreases  with  the  degree  of US  liberalization. 
(2)  By  inspection of Figure  4,  below the  inflection point,  the  slope 
of each  indifference curve  becomes  steeper with greater tariffs.  By  Table 
4,  the  slope  is always  less  than  -1.  Thus,  at the  margin,  the  US  gives  up  a 
greater tariff for  a  smaller cut  in the price wedge.  Furthermore,  the 
marginal  trade  off decreases with each greater tariff.  For  example,  for 
curve  2,  the  trade offs are  a  tariff increase of 5  percent  for  a  wedge  cut 
of 2.6  percent  (from 7.4  to  10  percent)  and  a  tariff increase of 27  percent 
(from  5  to  32  percent)  for  a  cut of 4.2 percent  (from  10  to 14.2 percent). 
Hence,  for  a  given US  policy,  additional wedge  cuts are obtained at the 
price of larger increases  in tariffs until the point of inflection is 
reached. 
Two  points  in the  treaty action space,  one  each on  curve  1  and  2,  are 
chosen to discuss  the  economic  and welfare  consequences  of harmonization. 
These  are  the first two  interior harmonizations  for  the first  two  US 
policies:  the  status  qu~;  and no  CCC  support of oils seed cakes,  no  EEP  for 
grains'and target price equals  1.25  times  world price.  Call  these  the first 
and  second harmonizations,  respectively. 
Both harmonizations  lead to  increases  in the  world price of grain.  In 
37 the first,  the  EC  cut in the price wedge  for grain and oil seed cakes 
decreases its excess  supply  inducing a  corresponding  increase  in world grain 
price by 1.1 percent.  In  the  second,  excess  supplies  are  reduced  further  by 
the  US  support cut and  the abolition of the  EEP  and  the  additional  EC  cuts 
in price wedges  causing the  world grain price  to  increase  by 6.4 percent 
relative  to  the  status quo.  The  world price of feed grain substitutes 
declines  for both scenarios.  The  decline  is greater in the first 
harmonization because  the  tariff on  EC  imports  is larger  than  in the  second. 
The  price of oil seed cakes  decreases  by  1.1 percent  in the first 
harmonization as  a  result of the  EC  tariff on  cakes  and  the  feed grain 
substitution effect.  It rises  in the  second case  by 0.6 percent because of 
the  US  abolition of the  CCC  support which  decreases  US  production enough  to 
raise its world price despite  EC  tariffs. 
In the  EC,  the  groups  most  affected by harmonization are  the producers 
of grains  and animal  feeds,  consumers  and  the budget.  This affect is 
consistent with  the  EC  intention to  restructure  input prices  to affect 
animal  sector  incomes  minimally.  This  accomplished,  the  important political 
trade off is between  the  budget  savings  and  the welfare  losses of producers 
of grains  and oil seed cakes.'  Producers  lose about  1.02 billion ECU  in the 
first harmonization and about  1.2 billion ECU  in the  second.  ~or the first 
and second harmonization,  EC  budget savings  of 1.13  and 1.22 billion ECU 
accrue  from  tariff revenues  and  from  diminished outlays  for  grain 
restitutions and oil seed cake  subsidies.  Increases  in consumer surplus of 
0.37  and 0.48 billion ECU  are  then sufficient to  overcome  the  lose  to 
86  producers  and,  hence,  push  V  ,  to zero.  ec, 
In the first harmonization,  US  producer losses  (0.34 billion ECU)  are 
small,  slightly less  than  the budget  savings,  evenly distributed across all 
sectors except for  the  grains  and sugar whose  output prices are unchanged at 
38 the status quo.  Consumer  gains  are negligible.  In the  second 
harmonization,  the major  trade off is between producer surplus  in grains  and 
oil seed cakes  and  the budget.  In contrast to  the  EC,  although  the values 
of the  US  PCF  do  not  change  much  from  one  harmonization  to  the  other  (see 
Panel  1  and  2,  Table 4),  the magnitude  of budget  savings  and  producer 
surplus  losses  increase dramatically relative  to  the  first harmonization. 
US  producer  losses  are  6.96 billion ECU  while budget  savings  and  consumer 
gains  are  7.78  and 0.36 billion ECU,  respectively. 
The  social gain to  the  EC  is  about 0.5 billion ECU  for both 
harmonizations.  For  the  US,  the  social gain  increases  from  0.02  in the 
first to  1.18 billion ECU  in the  second.  This  change  reflects  the effects 
of the  large target price reduction for  grains  in the  US. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  previous  section presented results of  three  groups  of simulations 
to test whether  the  game  theoretic model  is consistent with  the  respective 
negotiating positions of the  US  and  the  EC  by  finding sets of policies 
within those negotiating positions which  lead to mutually advantageous 
outcomes  for  the  US  and the  EC. 
!  _  In the  games  section,  the estimated model  seemed  consistent with  the  US 
(
negotiating position of free  trade with decoupling.  It was  shown  that  for 
the  US  and the  EC,  the  introduction of decoupled payments  to  producers  coul~ 
\f.'  ead to unilateral libtralization.  Freer  trade,  not  free  trade,  results 
ecause it remains  polfically optimal  for  consumers  to bear part of the cost 
of agricultural policies.  By  extension,  recent  instrument  innovations of 
I  . 
I the  US  and  the  EC  have  occured out of self interest because  they  implicitly 
l 
decouple  a  po~tion of the  support  payment  from  production decisions. 
In the  tariffication section,  the  US  proposal  to  transform domestic 
support policies on oil seed cakes  into equivalent tariffs on cakes  and  feed 
39 grain substitutes was  evaluated.  Tariffs on cakes  and  FGS  between seven and 
forty percent are mutually advantageous  for  the  US  and  the  EC.  The 
harmonization section addressed the  EC  proposal  to  trade cuts  in support 
prices of oil seed cakes  and  in domestic  prices of grains  for  the 
introduction of tariffs on cakes  and  feed grain substitutes.  Mutually 
advantageous  actions of  EC  harmonization and  US  liberilization were  found. 
However,  the political and social gains  of harmonization and  tariffication 
are  small  compared  to  the political and social gains  from  trade 
liberalization that introduces  decoupled payments  and  abolishes  export 
subsidies  and production subsidies  on  exported commodities. 
As  mentioned,  the strict application of the  model  requires stability in 
the political process  and  the  economic  environment.  When  these  change 
weights  and  instruments  may  change.  For  example,  the  1986  policies  led to 
unusually high budget outlays  in the  US  and  the  EC.  These  outlays may  have 
induced countervailing lobbying by  those  adversely affected with  the  result 
that the weights  of producer·;;  could bave  declined since  1986.  Thus  the 
treaty action spaces  may  understate  the  loss  in producer  incomes  that  the  US 
and  the  EC  may  be willing to  trade  for  lower budget costs of agricultural 
policies. 
Reconciling  the special status of agriculture with trade  liberaliation 
C1' 
has  been a  major obst}tle in obtaining an agricultural  trade  agreement 
during the Uruguay  Round  of the  GATT  negotiaitions.  To  quantify this 
special status,  the model  presented characterizes  the  1986  agricultural 
policies of the  US  and  the  EC  as  rational outcomes  of their respective 
political processes.  The  model  suggests  that such a  reconciliation is  . 
possible:  Of  course it is only a.necessary condition for  a  GATT  treaty 
-should one  be  agreed to at the  current Uruguay  Round- that it is acceptable 
to  the  US  and  the  EC;  other parties to  the  GATT  must  also agree  to  the 
40 treaty.  If multilateral 1ibera1izaiton increases world prices more  than 
bilateral EC/US  liberalization then US  and  EC  producer  losses will be  less 
and their budget savings  greater.  The  treaty action spaces  of the  US  and 
the  EC  will consequently expand over other liberal alternatives making  more 
liberal outcomes  more  likely. 
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